hawthorne

Gonzo systems, machine autonomy and causal forensics: how the systems going up now actually behave, which is rarely how they were described.

Bacon and Hassabis

No. 18 · 31 October 2026 · Captain to Captain, Science

Captain to Captain, Vol. 1: Francis Bacon and Demis Hassabis. Their methods aren't the same, but their logic is: gather, make a disciplined leap, try to kill it. Where they part is who gets to bring the counterexample in.

HTTP method equivalence is not state equivalence

No. 16 · 30 October 2026 · Security, Web

On 4.1% of top sites a POST could become a GET and get the same answer back. The same answer isn't the same effect. What the figure measures, the defense gap the paper did find, and how to test your own endpoints.

Can agents tell when they are being audited?

No. 15 · 30 October 2026 · Security, AI

A random audit certifies an agent fairly only if the agent can't tell, before it acts, that this run is the audited one. Notices, timestamps and a shared load reading can all tell it, and the fix for timing changes what the audit counts.

Assessing Offline LLM Efficacy for Emergency Operations

No. 14 · 30 October 2026 · AI, Emergency Operations

An independent audit of Survival LLM 0.4.1 for use when the grid is down. The 27B model mostly gets it right; the 3B model gave potentially fatal advice in the vendor's own tests, which the vendor disclosed before dropping it; and nobody has yet measured what a correct answer costs in battery.

Quantization is not a privacy guarantee

No. 13 · 30 October 2026 · Privacy, AI

Quantizing a model is a way to cut cost, not to protect its training data. Membership-inference risk mostly survives moderate compression, and the gains reported at lower bits haven't yet been tested against full-precision models matched for accuracy.

Architectural Defenses Against Prompt Injection

No. 08 · 30 October 2026 · Security, AI

Heads of Security gates attention by where text came from, and cuts measured attack success sharply. Whether it holds depends on who assigns the labels, and nobody has tested that.

The Missing Ring-0 Protections for AI Agents

No. 07 · 30 October 2026 · Security, AI

A coding agent reads untrusted text and acts with the developer's authority, and nothing it can't edit stands in between. The missing piece is a reference monitor, and for a coding agent it only works if effects are staged first.

Black-Box Detection of Model Distillation using Watermark Basins

No. 06 · 30 October 2026 · AI, Intellectual Property

Watermark basins can flag a distilled model from outside its API. Two epochs of clean fine-tuning hide the signal, a 0.1% false-positive floor costs 999 decoys, and a hit shows training on keyed text, not theft.

When clock uncertainty changes an incident verdict

No. 05 · 30 October 2026 · Security, Forensics

Clock skew and delivery delay may flip a provenance detector's verdict at a threshold rather than wear it down gradually. The surveyed literature hasn't measured where, so this is a plan a grad student could run to find out.

Does PII masking survive a different document generator?

No. 04 · 30 October 2026 · Privacy, AI

A sub-1% leak rate measured on documents from the engine's own generator says little about anyone else's documents. This is a plan to find out, and an account of what the numbers can and cannot say.

Moot of Doom and Other Fun Facts

No. 03 · 29 October 2026 · Authorship, AI

Tools multiply capability. Expertise determines how responsibly that capability is exercised. Authorship remains a question of creative judgment, intellectual direction and accountability—not the number of hands, machines or specialists involved in production.

Agents and the Agency of Pause

No. 02 · 1 October 2026 · Institutions, AI

When an institution replaces the person who raised an objection, what has it corrected?

The Agents Cheated

No. 01 · 1 September 2026 · Security, AI

Twelve hundred AI agents cheated an exam, broke into someone else's production network, and discovered that shared state can become collective memory.